Pascal Wagner-Egger
University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology, Faculty Member
Belief in conspiracy theories has often been associated with a biased perception of randomness, akin to a nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic. Indeed, a low prior for randomness (i.e., believing that randomness is a priori unlikely)... more
Belief in conspiracy theories has often been associated with a biased perception of randomness, akin to a nothing-happens-by-accident heuristic. Indeed, a low prior for randomness (i.e., believing that randomness is a priori unlikely) could plausibly explain the tendency to believe that a planned deception lies behind many events, as well as the tendency to perceive meaningful information in scattered and irrelevant details; both of these tendencies are traits diagnostic of conspiracist ideation. In three studies, we investigated this hypothesis and failed to find the predicted association between low prior for randomness and conspiracist ideation, even when randomness was explicitly opposed to malevolent human intervention. Conspiracy believers' and nonbelievers' perceptions of randomness were not only indistinguishable from each other but also accurate compared with the normative view arising from the algorithmic information framework. Thus, the motto "nothing happens...
Research Interests:
This paper explores a marginal type of beliefs (e.g. not recognized by social institutions such as science and religion), namely beliefs about the potential effects of full moon on life events, and particularly on human behaviour.... more
This paper explores a marginal type of beliefs (e.g. not recognized by social institutions such as science and religion), namely beliefs about the potential effects of full moon on life events, and particularly on human behaviour. Interviews, word associations, a questionnaire and an experiment were conducted in the area of social representation of the full moon. The main phenomena observed were the presence of organizing principles in participants’ discourses (i.e. symbolic oppositions between science and folk beliefs, men and women, "fools" and "sane" people, "primitive" and "civilized" persons, etc.) and the expression of hypothesis confirmation.
Research Interests:
ABSTRACT In the psychology of reasoning, and more broadly, of problem solving, little attention had been paid to the social characteristics of the participants, in relation to the content of the problem (Light, 1997). This was the purpose... more
ABSTRACT In the psychology of reasoning, and more broadly, of problem solving, little attention had been paid to the social characteristics of the participants, in relation to the content of the problem (Light, 1997). This was the purpose of the present experiments. Wason's selection task (Wason, 1966, 1968) is a deductive problem with a pragmatically very rich content. In the long history of research on this task, effects of deontic content, utilities, probabilities, and social role were reported (see for example Newstead & Evans, 1995). It seemed thus to be a convenient tool to investigate some effects such as the influence of the social group or that of ideology. Participants from contrasted social groups (78 university students in economics and 99 in social sciences) were put in two opposite perspectives, or social roles, (Manktelow & Over, 1991) on a deontic version of the selection task (the “Day-off rule”, Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). Before the completion of the task, they were primed by one of the two ideological values distinguished by Katz & Hass (1988) in their research on modern racism (i.e. Protestant Ethic and Humanitarianism/Egalitarianism). Hypotheses were that a “homology” effect would appear, that is, a better performance when the social group was in accordance to the social role, particularly when the Protestant Ethic value that focuses on competition was primed. The results partially supported this conjecture: such a homology effect was observed, but only in the “Protestant Ethic” condition. In order to show that the influence of the social group and social role are not restricted to a particular problem, participants were then requested in the second experience to solve a simple arithmetic task, which can also vary according to the perspective on the problem. The results indicated that the homology effect was partially replicated. These two preliminary studies suggest the relevance to explore variables at the positional (social groups with different social status) and ideological levels, by contrast to the situational and intrapersonal levels of explanation in social psychology (Doise, 1986). They also illustrate the social processes that occur in cheater-detection or thinking about deontic rules, against the evolutionary approaches of reasoning.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Two experiments were conducted to show that the IF … THEN … rules used in the different versions of Wason's (1966) selection task are not psychologically—though they are logically—equivalent. Some of these rules are considered by the... more
Two experiments were conducted to show that the IF … THEN … rules used in the different versions of Wason's (1966) selection task are not psychologically—though they are logically—equivalent. Some of these rules are considered by the participants as strict logical conditionals, whereas others are interpreted as expressing a biconditional relationship. A deductive task was used jointly with the selection task to show that the original abstract rule is quite ambiguous in this respect, contrary to deontic rules: the typical “error” made by most people may indeed be explained by the fact that they consider the abstract rule as a biconditional. Thus, there is no proper error or bias in the selection task as it is still argued, but a differential interpretation of the rule. The need for taking into account a pragmatic component in the process of reasoning is illustrated by the experiments.
